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CubeSat-määrittelyyn pohjautuvien satelliittien tutkimusprojektit ovat yhä suo-
situmpia yliopistoissa ympäri maailman. Nanosatelliittiprojektit tarjoavat mie-
lenkiintoisia haasteita, ja satelliitin luotettavuus tulee huomioida arkkitehtuurin
suunnittelussa, jotta voidaan välttää satelliitin tehtävän epäonnistuminen.
Aalto-1 -nanosatelliitti on Aalto-yliopiston opiskelijaprojekti, joka alkoi noin vii-
si vuotta sitten. Satelliitti pohjautuu CubeSat-määrittelyyn, ja sen tieteelliset
tehtävät ovat monispektrikuvantaminen, säteilymittaukset, ja kokeellisen sähkö-
purjeen testaaminen.
Tämän diplomityön tavoitteena on arvioida Aalto-1-nanosatelliitin ohjelmis-
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välttää, ja mahdollisilla jatkotutkimuksilla voitaisiin varmistaa omien protokol-
lien ja tärkeiden palautumisproseduurien oikeellisuus.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
AaSI Aalto Spectral Imager
ADCS Attitude Determination and Control System
CAN Controller Area Network
COTS Commercial-Oﬀ-The-Shelf
ECC Error-Correcting Code
EPB Electrostatic Plasma Brake
EPS Electrical Power System
FDIR Failure Detection, Isolation, Recovery
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
FRAM Ferroelectric Random-Access Memory
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
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RADMON Radiation Monitor
RTC Real-Time Clock
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A student nanosatellite project provides exciting design and implementation
challenges from both hardware and software points of view. The satellite
hardware must be able to function properly in space, which is a much harsher
environment than what is typically expected in projects with oﬀ-the-shelf
hardware. The satellite software must have at least basic recovery capabilities
from failures, and the limited debugging possibilities must be considered
when designing the system.
Small satellites are typically categorized based on their mass. A satellite
with mass between 1 and 10 kg is categorized as a nanosatellite, and a satellite
with mass between 0.1 and 1 kg is a picosatellite [17]. CubeSat [9] is a popular
speciﬁcation for small satellites, such as pico- or nanosatellites, consisting of
one or more 10 cm cubes with mass less than 1.33 kg. The individual cubes
are connected to each other along a single axis, so a 3U CubeSat is 30 cm
long and is typically categorized as a nanosatellite.
Aalto-1 [35] is a student nanosatellite project expected to launch in the
beginning of 2016. The satellite follows the CubeSat speciﬁcation and in
addition to the main platform includes three payloads with custom hardware
and software. Its scientiﬁc goals include spectral imaging, radiation monitor-
ing, and testing of an experimental de-orbiting device. The target duration
of the mission is two years.
1.1 Problem statement
This thesis evaluates the reliability of Aalto-1 On-Board Computer (OBC)
[38] software, and focuses especially on error detection and recovery mecha-
nisms and both internal and external communication systems. Since many
fundamental software design decisions were set before this thesis was written,
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the main focus is on evaluation and analysis, not ﬁxing all ﬂaws or preventing
all potential error conditions. Aalto-1 employs a wide variety of software, so
choosing the most important targets for evaluation is challenging. Issues in
any part of the system can lead to a mission failure. However, the majority of
the software components are existing well-tested software, so we focus mostly
on custom critical software components built by the Aalto-1 team.
Some of the most important parts of a nanosatellite architecture are the
components that contribute to having working communication with a ground
station. Communication is vital for downlinking telemetry and scientiﬁc
data, which are fundamental for a successful mission. While bandwidth and
time limitations greatly complicate debugging and maintenance operations,
working communication also makes it possible to manually recover from some
error situations which the satellite can not handle automatically by itself.
Therefore the main focus of recovery mechanisms should be to maintain a
working communication link with the ground station.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
Chapter 2 explains the core challenges in implementing reliable software in a
CubeSat satellite. Chapter 3 describes the architecture of Aalto-1. Chapter 4
describes the multiple watchdog mechanisms and the boot procedure used in
Aalto-1. Chapter 5 evaluates the reliability of the I2C protocol and shared
library used in the project. Chapter 6 evaluates important aspects of reliable
communication with the ground station. Chapter 7 includes discussion about
potential future research topics and architectural improvements. Chapter 8
concludes the thesis.
The main contribution of this thesis is analysis and documentation of soft-
ware designed and developed by other people. However, Chapter 4 and 5 in-
clude subsections that describe improvements to the original design of Aalto-1
that were developed as part of this thesis.
Chapter 2
Nanosatellite software challenges
Like many other recent research satellites, Aalto-1 follows the CubeSat spec-
iﬁcation [9], which speciﬁes physical constraints, and does not mandate any
speciﬁc hardware or software architecture for the on-board computer or other
components. There are constraints for physical characteristics such as mass
and volume, but the speciﬁcation leaves a lot of ﬂexibility in On-Board Com-
puter (OBC) hardware design.
Unlike in avionics or automobile systems, nanosatellite failure scenarios
will most likely not result in human casualties. However, reliability should
still be considered in the design, because the environment makes many failure
scenarios much more probable than on Earth, and a mission failure can have
a signiﬁcant cost in both time and money.
2.1 Physical environment
Space is a harsh environment, where hardware components face much more
ionizing radiation than on Earth. This increases the probability of both hard
errors, such as permanent damage to a memory cell, and soft errors, such
as bit ﬂips in dynamic memory. The satellite must also survive temperature
changes and vibration during launch. [17]
A soft error is often called a Single Event Upset (SEU), which is a non-
destructive change of state in memory or logic element. Typically the change
involves just a single bit, but high-energy radiation can cause changes in
multiple bits at the same time. A SEU could for example change the contents
of a memory cell, or disrupt the internal logic of a processor. A change of a
single bit in the internal L1 cache of a processor or a logic gate can lead to
unexpected software behaviour and potentially to disastrous results. [4]
Integrated circuits based on Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconduc-
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tor (CMOS) technology are suspectible to Single Event Latchups (SELs).
A high-energy particle may inject a small current into a positive feedback
loop structure, which causes a high-current state that may cause permanent
damage to the chip. [30]
Soft errors can be mitigated by the use of error-correcting codes (ECC).
A RAM chip with ECC can detect and correct some errors caused by SEUs
without any impact to the software. Memory must be scrubbed periodically,
or soft errors might accumulate undetected in less often used areas of mem-
ory. Scrubbing involves reading all memory contents, correcting bit errors if
possible, and writing data back into the memory.
A hard error involves permanent damage to the aﬀected component. The
risk of a mission failure due to hard errors can be reduced by including
radiation-resistant components or redundancy in the hardware design. More
advanced components may have additional latch-up protection circuitry.
2.2 Hardware and software choices
Early CubeSats such as CUTE-I [34] used a Microcontroller Unit (MCU)
device as the main processor in the OBC architecture. MCU devices are
still popular, but recent CubeSats often use more powerful processors. For
example, 16-bit Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontrollers have been used
in many CubeSats such as Delﬁ-C3 [54], Delﬁ-n3Xt [12], the Vermont Tech
Cubesat [8] and WinCube [42]. 32-bit ARM processors oﬀer even more com-
puting power and ﬂexibility, while still keeping power requirements low.
The processor choice greatly aﬀects the software architecture. A simple
16-bit microcontroller might use custom bare-metal software for everything
or an operating system suitable for MCUs such as FreeRTOS [3]. A more
powerful processor can even use a full embedded Linux operating system,
which increases system complexity as more software is needed, but it makes a
satellite more ﬂexible and approachable to people less familiar with low-level
MCU software architectures. There is also a signiﬁcant amount of existing
software for Linux that can be used in the satellite, which can lower the
development costs.
FreeRTOS was used for example in the ESTCube-1 satellite. The op-
erating system was chosen based on its low ﬂash and RAM requirements,
deterministic scheduling, and simple support for keeping an idle MCU in
sleep to reduce power consumption. [48]
California Polytechnic State University started with 8-bit microcontrollers
in their CP-series CubeSats, but eventually switched to 32-bit ARM proces-
sors and Linux. The use of existing kernel code, and having support for
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modern languages such as Python were considered important beneﬁts in the
operating system choice. [29]
2.3 Upgradability and conﬁgurability
The possibility to update the satellite software is desirable, because software
updates can be used to ﬁx problems found after the launch and they can also
make it possible to reconﬁgure the satellite if necessary. Directly reﬂashing
software components stored in nonvolatile memory is a simple but potentially
risky way of performing updates. If the update is interrupted, or there is any
kind of data corruption in memory, the update might result in a mission
failure unless some safety features are included in the update process. If
hardware redundancy is included in the hardware architecture, it might be
possible to recover by using previous software stored in secondary memory.
A ﬁeld-programmable gate array (FPGA) oﬀers additional conﬁgurability
compared to simple microcontrollers and software updates performed by re-
ﬂashing. The programmable logic blocks of an FPGA can be reprogrammed
to perform diﬀerent functions depending on mission requirements. FPGA
devices can also have specialized blocks such as Digital Signal Processing
(DSP) blocks that make such devices very ﬂexible and powerful for many
applications. [38]
N. Bergmann and A. Dawood suggest that the reprogrammability of FP-
GAs enables repairing of many errors in ﬂight. However, a reprogrammable
FPGA such as one based on SRAM technology, is very suspectible to radiation-
induced errors, and fault tolerance needs to be considered in the architecture
design. [6]
2.4 Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery
Failure Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) is an important part of
nanosatellite architecture. Failure scenarios are likely to happen during the
mission of a satellite, and the satellite must be able to recover from many
problems autonomously, because a human operator cannot necessarily per-
form recovery unless communication systems are still operational. All failures
can not be detected, and not all of detected failures can be recovered from.
Failure detection mechanisms can include watchdog systems, ECC, and
checksums. Some failures can be isolated, for example, by switching to a
secondary component if hardware redundancy is present. The main goal of
failure recovery is to get the system back to an operational state. Recovery
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action can be a small correction such as ﬁxing a single bit error, or a more
drastic action such as rebooting the entire system or isolating a misbehaving
component completely from the rest of the system. [25]
2.5 Communication with the satellite
Communication with the satellite is usually performed by one or more ground
stations that are located on Earth at positions suitable to the orbit of the
satellite. The number of available ground stations and the orbit aﬀect the
time that is available for communication. Ground stations may monitor
and control the satellite by sending telecommand (TC) packets and receiv-
ing telemetry (TM) packets. Communication between a nanosatellite and a
ground station is often fundamentally asymmetrical, because the uplink and
downlink bandwidths can diﬀer by more than one order of magnitude. The
uplink can be several orders of magnitude slower than the downlink, so TC
packets have much less bandwidth available than TM packets. [17]
2.6 Software processes and tools
CubeSat projects are often student projects with educational goals, so the
software processes, programming languages, software libraries, and other
tools need to be chosen so that they are accessible to students and do not
complicate or slow down the project too much. Expert teams in commercial
projects can use the best possible tools available, but a Master's degree stu-
dent cannot be expected to be productive with very complicated industrial
tools. [49]
The C programming language is widely used in embedded software projects,
so it is also a natural choice for most software in a nanosatellite. However,
C requires signiﬁcant programmer discipline and its many low-level charac-
teristics make it diﬃcult to write error-free code. Several safety-oriented C
programming language subsets and programming standards have been pub-
lished to alleviate the challenges involved in writing correct C code.
The CERT C coding standard [43] consists of rules and recommendations
about code style, programming patterns, language features, and commonly
used platforms. It focuses on program reliability and security, but many of
the rules might not be very relevant in embedded projects. A more relevant
alternative could be MISRA C [1], which is used in the automotive industry
and in safety-critical projects. L. Hatton [19] compared safe C subsets, and
found some fundamental problems in MISRA C, but considered it to be an
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improvement over other unnamed C standards. If the software architecture
and hardware capabilities permit the use of other programming languages,
C might not be the best choice for all nanosatellite software.
C. Brandon suggests that using the Ada programming language could
improve the reliability of nanosatellite software. The Vermont Tech Cube-
Sat uses an MSP430 processor, and the satellite software is programmed
with SPARK, which is a subset of Ada. Using Ada also oﬀers pedagogi-
cal advantages, because students get valuable experience of development of
high-integrity software. [8]
The software development process can also signiﬁcantly aﬀect the relia-
bility of the resulting software. In their 2009 paper, C. Ebert and C. Jones
[13] describe several characteristics of embedded software projects. They
suggest that 30 to 40 percent of resources in embedded software projects are
spent on testing, and this eﬀort could be reduced by detecting defects earlier.
For example, a combination of automated testing, code analysis, and code
reviews can help reduce the total amount of defects and the testing eﬀort.
2.7 Surveys of previous CubeSat projects
J. Guo and J. Bouwmeester collected data of 94 pico- and nanosatellites in
their 2010 paper [7]. The paper suggests that at the time Microchip PIC and
Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontrollers were most common in OBCs,
but ARM devices were also starting to become more popular. Almost half
of CubeSat missions ended in failure, and around one third of the satellites
did not launch successfully.
M. Swartwout has collected statistics about CubeSat projects in several
papers [4952], which have been published approximately yearly. His latest
paper from 2013 [52] presents some interesting statistics about CubeSat mis-
sion failures. Firstly, the average failure rate in university CubeSat projects
is almost 50%. Secondly, the total number of yearly failing CubeSats has
not diminished over the years during which statistics have been collected.
Thirdly, the most common failure is no contact at all with the satellite after
launch, followed by problems in the communication system, power subsys-
tem, and ﬁnally the main processor.
Chapter 3
The architecture of Aalto-1 satel-
lite
3.1 Hardware overview
From a software reliability point of view, the most important architectural
components of the Aalto-1 nanosatellite are the OBC, the Arbiter, commu-
nication radios, and the payload components. The satellite hardware has
been tested with rigorous physical tests according to ECSS standards. This
includes radiation and thermal tests. [23]
The components used in the OBC and connected systems are mostly
commercial-oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS) components, which are not speciﬁcally de-
signed for use in space. In order to decrease the probability of mission failure
and to make the goal of a two year mission more realistic, the hardware
includes some cold-redundant components to achieve some hardware fault
tolerance. [38]
The system includes an Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) and an Serial Pe-
ripheral Interface (SPI) bus that are used to communicate between devices.
Some devices that use the I2C bus use the custom Aalto-1 I2C protocol, which
is described in Chapter 5. The OBC also has two Universal Asynchronous
Receiver/Transmitter (UART) connections to devices. Figure 3.1 shows a
simpliﬁed connectivity diagram with the main focus on critical components
required for functional communication. [22, 46]
Concerning the buses in the satellite, this thesis evaluates the reliability
of only the I2C bus, but other internal communication mechanisms also con-
tribute to the reliability of the entire system, and could be potential targets
for further research.
18
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Figure 3.1: Simpliﬁed connectivity diagram
3.1.1 The OBC
The OBC CPU is Atmel AT91RM9200 [2], which is a microprocessor based on
an ARM920T core. The hardware architecture includes two separate OBCs,
so a hard failure in just one OBC does not cause mission failure. Only one
OBC is active at any time, and a full reboot is required to switch the active
OBC. Both OBCs include non-volatile NAND and NOR ﬂash memories, and
have an additional DataFlash memory connected to the SPI bus. In order to
boot the system successfully, an OBC must have access to working boot and
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root memories. The system supports booting from NOR ﬂash or DataFlash,
while the root memory can be mounted from NOR ﬂash or NAND ﬂash.
The NAND ﬂash is additionally divided into a larger primary ﬁlesystem and
a smaller recovery ﬁlesystem. Therefore there is a total of 12 possible boot
conﬁgurations, where each conﬁguration includes the selected OBC, boot
memory, and root memory. The root ﬁlesystems use the Unsorted Block
Image File System (UBIFS), which is a ﬁlesystem intended for raw ﬂash,
and includes support for wear leveling. [27, 39]
The OBC hardware is not radiation hardened, although the NAND ﬂash
includes support for an error-correcting code (ECC). Therefore soft and hard
errors are expected, and error detection and recovery need to be considered
in the system design.
3.1.2 The Arbiter
A crucial component in enabling fault tolerance is the Arbiter, which is a
MSP430-series microcontroller that selects which of the redundant compo-
nents are in use. MSP430 [53] was chosen because it has already been used
in Cubesats such as Delﬁ-C3 [54], Delﬁ-n3Xt [12], the Vermont Tech Cube-
sat [8] and WinCube [42]. The Arbiter is a single point of failure, but the
model used in the OBC uses non-volatile ferroelectric RAM (FRAM) mem-
ory, which also supports an error-correcting code (ECC). Empirical tests
[55, 56] indicate FRAM components perform well in radiation-harsh envi-
ronments, and can be expected to be much more reliable than other RAM
or ﬂash components.
The Arbiter controls redundant hardware components by using General-
purpose input/output (GPIO) lines to control which components are in use
at any given time. GPIO lines with heartbeat signals from both OBCs are
connected to the Arbiter, which monitors the OBCs and reacts if the current
OBC heartbeat stops or is never activated after boot. [27]
3.1.2.1 Switching logic
The most important part of the Arbiter software is the switching logic, which
determines whether the OBC boot conﬁguration should be changed, resets
the OBCs, and starts the selected OBC with the chosen conﬁguration. Con-
ﬁguration parameters include OBC selection, boot memory, root memory,
and UHF radio selection. The Arbiter stores the conﬁguration and statistics
of each OBC in a structure residing in non-volatile memory, so the Arbiter
retains its state even if it is powered oﬀ. Therefore the switching logic will
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not be reset even if the entire satellite is powered oﬀ by the Electrical Power
System (EPS).
The switching procedure is always executed when the Arbiter powers up,
and whenever the active OBC heartbeat stops. There is no way of command-
ing the Arbiter to run the switching procedure, but the OBC may request an
OBC or UHF radio change directly. It is however possible to indirectly force
the Arbiter to run the switching procedure by preventing the OBC heartbeat
from starting at boot time.
When the switching procedure is executed, the Arbiter increases the failed
boot counter by one, and clears the current heartbeat statistics. If the num-
ber of failed boots passes a large threshold, the Arbiter switches to the other
OBC and its previous boot and root memory conﬁguration. If the threshold
is not reached, and the number of failed boots is low, the Arbiter will attempt
to boot the same conﬁguration without any changes. However, after a total
of four failed boots, the Arbiter starts switching boot and root memories.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the Arbiter switching logic.1
When booting the system, the Arbiter waits for at least 500 heartbeats
before the system is considered to be working and the failed boot counter is
cleared. Therefore even a successful boot will be considered a failure unless
the system stays up for long enough to accumulate the required number of
heartbeats.
3.1.3 Other important components
Another important component from the reliability perspective is the Electri-
cal Power System (EPS), which has its own mechanisms that may power oﬀ
the system in certain cases. For example, if the battery level decreases below
a certain point, the EPS will shut down most systems until the battery has
been charged back to nominal level. [16]
M. Siddique describes the power budget of Aalto-1 during diﬀerent mis-
sion phases. The estimated power usage varies depending on which subsys-
tems are in use, and power generation depends on several factors, including
the position of the satellite relative to the sun, and the health of the solar
cells. [44]
The OBC also includes two UHF radios, and the active radio can be
switched by the Arbiter. Software running in the OBC can request a switch
at any time by commanding the Arbiter.
The scientiﬁc payloads are not important from a reliability point of view,
but are crucial for the mission objectives. Aalto-1 includes the Aalto Spectral
1Reference: Aalto-1 Arbiter source code, 2.1.2016
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Figure 3.2: Arbiter switching logic
Imager (AaSI), Electrostatic Plasma Break (EPB), and Radiation Monitor
(RADMON). [23]
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3.2 Software platform
The OBC software platform is an embedded Linux platform based on Buil-
droot, which makes it easy to cross-compile a full embedded Linux system.
Aalto-1 does not have hard realtime requirements, so a standard Linux kernel
is used. Using Linux instead of other popular embedded operating systems,
such as FreeRTOS, has several beneﬁts. [40]
Firstly, Linux is widely supported in embedded contexts, so the availabil-
ity of device drivers is good, and a plethora of existing software can be used
instead of writing everything from scratch. Secondly, students are typically
already familiar with Linux, so working with the development and production
environments takes much less eﬀort than with less commonly used operating
systems. H. Sanmark [40] suggests that the use of simple UNIX commands
reduces the need to create custom software for simple ﬁle handling tasks.
The OBC uses a standard Linux 3.4.106 kernel with several patches. For
example, the kernel includes driver customizations to support the variable-
length packets of the Aalto-1 I2C protocol. This support can be toggled on
and oﬀ by the userland. A watchdog driver for the AT91RM9200 board is
also included in the kernel.
The system uses uClibc, which is a C standard library intended for em-
bedded systems. It lacks several features present in more commonly used
standard libraries such as glibc, but works well in an embedded context. [40]
Most standard Linux command-line tools are implemented by BusyBox,
which is a single binary that implements minimal versions of several standard
tools. The BusyBox binary is symbolically linked to several executable ﬁle
names, and chooses the right behaviour depending on how it was invoked.
3.2.1 Fundamental custom software components
The most fundamental software component for the scientiﬁc mission is the
communication software, because if communication is impossible, the satellite
is no longer useful. The communication software is started on every boot,
and is watched by a watchdog. It has exclusive access to the radio devices,
and will request a UHF radio switch from the Arbiter if no communication
has been observed in a certain time period. The communication software is
described in detail in Chapter 6.
The system includes three separate watchdogs, and all of them need to
be reset periodically, or the system will be reset. The watchdog mechanisms
are described in detail in Chapter 4.
The OBC includes a scheduler, which is used to execute payload pro-
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grams and other programs that need to be invoked based on a schedule. The
scheduler is not analyzed in detail in this thesis, because it is not required
for maintaining communication with the ground station. [45]
3.2.2 System logging and housekeeping
Logging and housekeeping facilities are fundamental in monitoring the health
of the satellite. Most components of Aalto-1 use POSIX syslog facilities,
which makes central collection of logs simple. Logs will be downlinked by the
communication software when requested by the ground station.A dedicated
housekeeping daemon program periodically collects telemetry data from the
Arbiter, the EPS, the Attitude Determination and Control System (ADCS),
and communication software.
Short downlinking opportunities and slow speeds limit how much logging
and housekeeping data can be transferred per day. [23]
3.2.3 Software upgrades
Upgrading software components in space is risky, but it might be desirable
if bug ﬁxes or miscellaneous upgrades are needed. Instead of ﬂashing entire
ﬁlesystems, the plan in the Aalto-1 project is to transfer individual ﬁles,
and to replace old ﬁles by renaming. Since there are several ﬁle systems in
the satellite hardware, software upgrades might need to be done on all ﬁle
systems.
3.3 Potential failure scenarios and design issues
3.3.1 Non-volatile memory corruption
Soft errors in non-volatile memories can cause corruption of ﬁles. The NAND
memories in the OBCs support ECC, but they must be scrubbed periodically.
Since memories are not shared between OBCs, corruption in the cold-
redundant OBCs memories cannot be detected or corrected without switching
to the other OBC. This suggests that periodic switching might be necessary
and should be scheduled during the mission lifetime.
Several software components in the system cause a signiﬁcant amount of
writes to the ﬁle system. Without proper wear leveling actively used areas in
the non-volatile memory could become corrupted due to wear after excessive
writing. However, Aalto-1 uses UBIFS which includes a wear-leveling layer
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that spreads writes across the device, which alleviates this issue transparently
to the main software running on the OBC.
3.3.2 Inﬁnite loop in a non-critical program
An inﬁnite loop can cause problems even if it happens in a non-critical pro-
gram such as a payload program. The program might block others from
using a shared resource, and would consume a signiﬁcant amount of power
and CPU time, which can result in drastic reduction in battery levels and
eventually the EPS would power down the system. Taking signiﬁcant CPU
time can also distort system process scheduling times, which could in extreme
cases cause timeouts or other failures in parts of the system which depend
on timing.
3.3.3 Rogue system partition writes
The OBC uses a single root partition that is always writable. A software
fault could cause a program to do unintended ﬁle writes or deletions. Some
embedded systems prefer separate system and data partitions to reduce the
risk of corrupting system ﬁles. Aalto-1 uses many shell scripts to perform
tasks, and they must be thoroughly checked for errors. For example, a typical
shell script error is removing a ﬁle and mistyping a variable name that is used
as a preﬁx. Unless the system shell is conﬁgured to check variable names,
running the command
rm -rf "$DIRCTORY"/
might attempt to remove everything in the root ﬁle system if the correct
command was supposed to be
rm -rf "$DIRECTORY"/
Having multiple root ﬁle systems greatly reduces the impact of even the
most catastrophic system partition writes. If the FDIR system works as
intended, the system would eventually boot with another working ﬁle system
if one exists.
3.3.4 Arbiter failures
While the Arbiter is resilient to radiation, it is still not impossible to have
bitﬂips or hard errors. Also, the Arbiter software has been thoroughly tested
but we cannot be fully sure that there will not be any software faults. The
Arbiter is the single point of failure in the FDIR design, so issues with it can
have serious consequences.
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3.3.5 Full root ﬁle system
The OBC uses a single root ﬁle system, so it can easily become full. For
example, a program might write a huge temporary ﬁle to /tmp, and fail to
clean it up. The system must be able to boot at least a minimal communi-
cation loop even if the root ﬁle system is full. The boot script handles this
scenario by using a pre-allocated ﬁle, so free disk space is not needed. If the
ﬁle system is full, certain features in the system cease to work. For example,
system logging will fail to append log messages to the log ﬁle.
3.3.6 Power loss
The EPS may power down the system at any point if the battery level goes
too low. The Arbiter will be reset, but should not lose any state since all
state is stored in non-volatile memory. The UBIFS ﬁlesystems in the OBC
root memories use journals and are tolerant to power loss. Therefore a power
loss should not cause any major issues in the system. If the cause for power
loss was low battery levels, the EPS will automatically power on the system
once the batteries have accumulated enough charge.
Chapter 4
Watchdogs and the boot procedure
The Aalto-1 satellite includes several system components that can be classi-
ﬁed as watchdogs. A watchdog contains a timer, which is periodically reset
by some other system component. If the timer is not reset before it reaches a
predeﬁned value, it is assumed that the watched component has failed, and
the watchdog attempts to restore the system by performing some recovery
actions.
The desired eﬀect of the recovery action of all Aalto-1 watchdog systems
is a full system restart, although there are some minor diﬀerences in how the
watchdogs achieve the system restart and what kind of eﬀects it has on the
overall FDIR logic.
The main design goal is to ensure that at least one watchdog is watching
the system at all times, and if a working communication loop is possible
with some system conﬁguration, the system will eventually converge to that
working conﬁguration.
Table 4.1 lists the watchdogs included in the Aalto-1 architecture.
Watchdog Watched component Recovery action
The Arbiter OBC heartbeat Arbiter logic and OBC
reboot
Kernel watchdog Userland watchdog OBC reboot
Userland watchdog Communication loop Watchdog termination
EPS watchdog I2C bus Power cycle
Table 4.1: Watchdogs in the Aalto-1 architecture
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4.1 Watchdogs in previous nanosatellite projects
Watchdog timers have been used extensively in previous nanosatellite projects.
Internal watchdogs in the OBC processors are often used, but sometimes ad-
ditional external chips are added.
In the WinCube satellite the internal watchdog of the MSP430-based
OBC was combined with an external MAX6814 watchdog integrated chip.
The internal watchdog is straightforward to use, but having another watch-
dog adds an extra layer of protection. MAX6814 was chosen, because it
does not use an oscillating crystal, which could be aﬀected by temperature
variations in space. [42]
The hardware architecture of the PilsenCube picosatellite somewhat re-
sembles the architecture of Aalto-1. The satellite includes two OBC micro-
controllers, and processor switching is performed by a dedicated hardware
watchdog that includes a timer. [15]
J. Beningo reviewed watchdog architectures in CubeSat applications, and
suggests that fault-tolerant CubeSat designs should in general be preferred
to fault-avoiding designs due to resource constraints involved in CubeSat
projects. [5]
4.2 The Arbiter and OBC heartbeat
The most important watchdog component in Aalto-1 is the Arbiter, which
listens to the heartbeat signal of the currently selected OBC. The Arbiter
controls the reset lines of both OBCs, so it can perform OBC switching,
and reboot an OBC at any time. When the heartbeat stops or is never
started after boot, an internal interrupt-based timer eventually triggers the
Arbiter logic, which decides the next boot conﬁguration and resets the OBCs.
Triggering the Arbiter logic is therefore an important recovery action in the
watchdog infrastructure, and the watchdogs and the boot procedure are de-
signed to work together to trigger this logic. The system design could be
simpliﬁed if triggering the Arbiter logic could be directly requested from the
OBC, but unfortunately this feature was never implemented. [27]
The OBC heartbeat is implemented by using a standard Linux GPIO LED
trigger driver (ledtrig-heartbeat). The kernel sends one initial heartbeat
when the GPIO is initialized, but the continuously active LED trigger has
to be activated from userland. This guarantees that the Arbiter will react
to any failure during boot that prevents the userland from booting. Once
activated, the heartbeat will be sent at regular intervals as long as the kernel
is running normally. Once the heartbeat is active, only a kernel panic can
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stop the heartbeat.
4.3 EPS watchdog and the I2C bus
The EPS also works as a watchdog in the system by monitoring the I2C bus,
and power cycling the entire system if there is no bus activity for a couple of
minutes. In normal scenarios frequent I2C activity is caused by processes such
as housekeeping data collection, so the EPS should not restart the system
unless the housekeeping daemon dies or the I2C bus becomes blocked for
some reason. [16]
Since the EPS watchdog does not watch the communication software in
any way, it can be considered a separate part of the FDIR architecture.
4.4 Improvements to the original design
The original FDIR design relied almost exclusively on the Arbiter. However,
the only input to the Arbiter from the OBC is the heartbeat, which only
signals that the Linux kernel is alive. In case of kernel panic, the heartbeat
is stopped. However, the existence of the heartbeat is not suﬃcient to deter-
mine whether the system has a working communication loop. For example,
the system might boot and start the kernel heartbeat, but the communication
daemon fails immediately at startup. Therefore more watchdog mechanisms
are needed.
4.4.1 Kernel watchdog and userland watchdog
The AT91RM9200 hardware used in the OBC includes a hardware watchdog,
which is supported by the Linux kernel used in Aalto-1. The kernel watchdog
can reboot the OBC, but rebooting will not be visible to the Arbiter, and
therefore is not included in the statistics collected by the Arbiter and used
in the Arbiter logic.
The kernel watchdog is not active by default, but it is activated by the
userland watchdog program, which also resets the kernel watchdog periodi-
cally. If the userland watchdog terminates, the kernel watchdog is no longer
reset and will eventually reboot the system. This also leads to a temporary
stop in the OBC heartbeat, but if the system boots quickly back up, the
Arbiter might not trigger its logic. Since the Arbiter is the only compo-
nent in the system that can switch boot conﬁgurations, the system design
must in some other way guarantee that reboots by the kernel watchdog will
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eventually lead to the Arbiter logic. This is achieved by a forced heartbeat
termination in the boot procedure after the system has been rebooted several
times.
4.4.2 Userland watchdog and the communication loop
The userland watchdog is a simple daemon program that watches the update
timestamp of a single ﬁle in the ﬁlesystem, and periodically resets the kernel
watchdog. If the watched ﬁle has not been updated within a predetermined
time interval, the watchdog terminates. Termination eventually leads to
full system reset by the kernel watchdog. Source code of the fundamental
functionality of the userland watchdog is included in Appendix A.
The watched ﬁle is touched in the communication software main loop
by using the POSIX utimensat function. If the communication software
terminates, crashes, or hangs, the ﬁle timestamp will not be updated and
the watchdog will terminate.
The userland watchdog has an important role during the boot procedure.
By default the OBC heartbeat is not enabled to guarantee that any kind
of boot failure leads to a reset by the Arbiter. However, once the userland
watchdog has started successfully, it also enables the heartbeat and takes
over the main responsibility of guaranteeing a working communication loop.
Since the heartbeat is enabled only after the userland watchdog is active,
there is no time period during the boot procedure when a system hang would
go undetected. This is a very important design detail, because the Arbiter
cannot alone guarantee working communication, and is oblivious to problems
if the heartbeat is still active.
4.4.3 Boot procedure
The boot procedure illustrated in Figure 4.1 has three possible outcomes:
1. No heartbeat, which triggers a reset by the Arbiter. Eventually
the Arbiter will try diﬀerent boot conﬁgurations.
2. Normal boot. The boot script starts the userland watchdog, the
communication software, and the scheduler.
3. Emergency boot. The boot script starts the userland watchdog and
the communication software in emergency mode.
Booting starts from the system bootloader, which loads the Linux kernel
from the chosen boot memory and mounts the chosen root ﬁlesystem. Even-
tually the kernel starts the init program, which runs the boot script that
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implements the userland side of the boot procedure. If the system does not
successfully reach the boot procedure, the OBC heartbeat is never started
and the Arbiter will eventually reboot the system and potentially switch the
boot conﬁguration.
The design distinquishes between normal and emergency boots, but this
distinction is not used in the ﬁnal ﬂight model software. The original idea
was to have a separate emergency mode where only the minimal software
required to achieve the communication loop would be started.
The boot script that implements the boot procedure uses a three-byte pre-
allocated ﬁle to store three separate unsigned counter values in non-volatile
memory. Preallocation and the use of random access functions to update the
ﬁle guarantee that the boot script works even if the root ﬁlesystem is full. It
is important to remember that the boot counter values are speciﬁc to a single
root ﬁlesystem, so if the Arbiter switches to a diﬀerent OBC or a diﬀerent
root ﬁlesystem, diﬀerent values are used.
4.4.3.1 Boot counters
The normal boot counter is a decreasing counter, which is never reset au-
tomatically. Therefore, after a certain number of reboots, normal mode is
never attempted again without manual intervention.
When normal boots are no longer available, emergency boots are at-
tempted if the counter is not zero. All software involved in an emergency
boot should do a minimal amount of work to achieve a working communica-
tion loop, and must work even if the ﬁlesystem is full.
When emergency boots are no longer available, forced resets are at-
tempted if the counter is not zero. The system halts execution and never
starts the heartbeat, so the Arbiter will eventually reset the system. Forced
resets are needed to force the Arbiter to eventually attempt other boot con-
ﬁgurations, even if the reboots are performed by the kernel watchdog.
When forced resets are no longer available, the emergency counter and
reset counter are reset to 20, and the system halts which eventually forces a
reboot by the Arbiter. This action restarts the cycle in the logic, although
normal boots will not be attempted again.
4.4.3.2 An example chain of events
Let us assume the communication daemon in a certain root ﬁlesystem is per-
manently broken and fails to start properly. Also, let us assume the system
boot is very quick, so a reboot by the hardware watchdog is seen by the Ar-
biter as just a small gap in the heartbeat. Therefore, repeated booting by the
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hardware watchdog is not enough to reliably trigger the Arbiter switching
logic. If the system does not use any special boot procedure, the following
chain of events may be observed.
1. A single heartbeat is sent as described in Section 4.2.
2. Userland watchdog is started, heartbeat is started.
3. Communication daemon is started and fails immediately.
4. Userland watchdog times out and kernel watchdog is no longer reset.
5. Kernel watchdog times out, reboots the system.
6. Go back to step 1.
It is possible the loop is terminated by some other system, such as the
EPS, but the boot procedure has no direct way of breaking out of this endless
loop that never enables working communication with the ground station. If
we assume the boot procedure explained in Figure 4.1 is used in the system,
the observed events are diﬀerent. For simplicity, let us assume that all boot
counters are initialized with the value 1.
1. A single heartbeat is sent as described in Section 4.2.
2. Normal boot counter is decreased and boot is attempted.
3. Kernel watchdog times out, reboots the system (steps 2-5 in previous
list).
4. A single heartbeat is sent.
5. Since normal boot counter is 0, emergency boot counter is decreased
and boot is attempted.
6. Kernel watchdog times out, reboots the system.
7. A single heartbeat is sent.
8. Since emergency boot counter is 0, forced resets counter is decreased
and the heartbeat stops.
9. Arbiter switching logic is executed.
The only point where the execution of the Arbiter switching logic is guar-
anteed is step 9. The presence of the boot counters guarantees that repeated
reboots will eventually lead to the execution of the Arbiter switching logic.
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4.5 Potential failure scenarios and design issues
4.5.1 Boot failures and reboot loops
The causes and eﬀects of boot failures have been carefully evaluated in the
system design. If the system fails to boot for any reason, the Arbiter will
reboot the system, and if the error persists, it is guaranteed to eventually try
diﬀerent boot conﬁgurations.
A more complicated scenario is an inﬁnite reboot loop, where the system
fails consistently, but the Arbiter fails to switch the boot conﬁguration. The
addition of forced reboots decreases the probability of this scenario, but it
cannot be completely ruled out. For example, the Arbiter considers a boot
successful, if it gets enough heartbeats after booting the system.
4.5.2 System crash or hang
Crashes of diﬀerent components in the system have been carefully evaluated
in the system design. All components except the Arbiter itself are watched by
a watchdog mechanism. If the crash was caused by a programming error or
a SEU, a reboot might be enough to ﬁx the cause. If the issue is permanent
and causes consistent crashes, the system will eventually try to switch to
diﬀerent boot conﬁgurations, which might make it possible to recover.
4.5.3 Inﬁnite loop in communication software
A software error could lead to two kinds of inﬁnite loops in the commu-
nication software. If the inﬁnite loop is an inner loop in the main loop,
the communication software stops touching the watch ﬁle, and the userland
watchdog will exit eventually triggering the kernel watchdog. However, if the
main loop gets stuck in an inﬁnite loop that doesn't enable communication,
it will still keep touching the watch ﬁle, and the watchdog mechanisms will
not be able to detect the error condition. Therefore the communication soft-
ware has to prefer fail-fast semantics whenever possible, and exit instead of
ignoring critical errors. If the communication system fails to signal failure to
the other FDIR components, recovery might not be possible.
4.5.4 Design complexity
One of the main issues with the boot procedure design is the use of re-
peated reboots in order to trigger the Arbiter logic. The same eﬀect could
be achieved in a simpler way if the Arbiter supported running the switching
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logic by request. However, the repeated reboots are required, because the
Arbiter code was frozen before the boot procedure was analyzed in detail,
and new commands could not be added anymore once the need for forcing
the Arbiter logic was understood. By forcing repeated reboots and making
sure that the heartbeat is never started, the boot script can ensure that the
Arbiter will run its logic eventually, but this design is not optimal.
In a better design all watchdogs would either be completely isolated, or
would work towards a common goal. The EPS watchdog in Aalto-1 does not
add much value, because it only watches secondary components in the system,
and can disrupt the main watchdogs by rebooting at unpredictable times. If
watching the I2C bus is considered important, the userland watchdog could
be very easily extended to watch more system resources. This would make
I2C errors to use the same recovery mechanism as the other watchdogs in the
system.
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Figure 4.1: Improved boot procedure
Chapter 5
Aalto-1 I2C protocol and library
I2C [37] is a popular 2-wire bus used for connecting integrated circuits to
each other. The byte-oriented protocol is simple, and does not have support
for high-level reliability-related features like checksums. In a nanosatellite
reliability of internal communication is desirable, so it might be necessary to
add a higher level protocol on top of I2C if possible. However, supporting an
extended protocol requires modifying the devices connected to the bus, so it
is only feasible if custom devices are used.
In Aalto-1, the OBC uses I2C to communicate with AaSI, the Arbiter,
ADCS, Electrostatic Plasma Brake (EPB), EPS, the Real-Time Clock (RTC),
and a temperature sensor. AaSI, EPB, and the Arbiter support an enhanced
custom protocol, while the other devices use the standard low-level I2C pro-
tocol. [46]
An I2C bus may have multiple masters, but in Aalto-1 the OBC is the
only master in order to eliminate the need for clock synchronization and bus
arbitration. Therefore all communication is always started by the OBC, and
the other devices simply react to commands, and may also return a response
to the OBC. [38]
5.1 I2C in previous nanosatellite projects
Some of the previous nanosatellite projects that have used I2C include Delﬁ-
n3Xt and several Cal Poly CubeSats. A survey [7] conducted by
J. Bouwmeester and J. Guo suggested that most nanosatellites with a shared
data bus use I2C.
In the Dutch Delﬁ-n3Xt satellite I2C was chosen over CAN for power,
availability, and familiarity reasons. The protocol was not extended, but the
hardware architecture of the system includes additional bus protector circuits
36
CHAPTER 5. AALTO-1 I2C PROTOCOL AND LIBRARY 37
to reduce the risk of rogue devices hanging the bus indeﬁnitely [10, 12]
CP2, also known by its in-orbit name CP4, was the ﬁrst Cal Poly satellite
to use the CPX bus, which is an internal data bus based on I2C. A high-level
protocol was added and the I2C library software for PIC microcontrollers
was replaced with a more robust software implementation. Even with these
improvements, CP2 failed in orbit three months after launch. The reason for
the failure is not fully known, but one plausible explanation is a blocked I2C
bus caused by a rogue device. [14, 24]
Cal Poly CP6 included several changes to the I2C-based CPX bus. CRC
checksums were added to the protocol, which reduces the chance of bit ﬂips
causing serious errors [32]. Error counts were included in telemetry collec-
tion, and data collected over the lifetime of CP6 suggests an estimated bus
transaction error rate of 8% [28].
5.2 Aalto-1 I2C protocol
The Aalto-1 I2C protocol is a packet-based protocol layered on top of the
low-level I2C protocol. It provides support for variable-length packets, packet
checksums, and includes a standard way for specifying commands and status
bytes. A single packet can be up to 257 bytes long, and consists of 4 bytes of
protocol ﬁelds, and up to 253 bytes of data. Table 5.1 describes the packet
structure. [41]
Field Size (bytes) Description
Packet length 1 Total length of command, status, and data
Command 1 Device-speciﬁc command code
Status 1 Command execution status
Data 0-253 Additional data
Checksum 1 8-bit XOR of preceding bytes
Total 4-257
Table 5.1: Aalto-1 I2C protocol packet structure
In Aalto-1, the OBC is the only master, while all other devices are slaves.
A single I2C transaction can be a one-way command or a two-way request and
response pair. Checksums are calculated on both sides for all sent packets,
and the receiving end veriﬁes the checksum before accepting a packet. In
addition to checksum veriﬁcation, command and status bytes are checked.
A one-way transaction is a simple command to a slave device, and no
response or any kind of acknowledgement is sent back. Therefore one-way
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commands are not guaranteed to always be reliable, since the protocol can
only guarantee the integrity of the command packet, but invalid packets will
simply be dropped and not even retried, since by deﬁnition the device will
not be able to send a response to the OBC to request a retry.
When performing a two-way transaction, the OBC sends a request and ex-
pects a response back. A response packet in a two-way transaction is expected
to have the same command byte as in the request. Reading the response is
retried three times, but writes are not automatically retried. Therefore it
is the application's responsibility to retry the high-level operation in failure
scenarios.
The software implementation is mostly in the user-space libicp library
described in the next section. However, since the low-level I2C protocol start
and stop sequences are sent by the kernel driver, a kernel patch was needed to
add support for variable-length packets. Variable-length support is enabled
by using a custom ioctl call, which is done automatically by the user-space
library when extended protocol packets are sent. When raw I2C is used to
communicate with ADCS or EPS, variable-length support is automatically
disabled, so programs can freely mix standard and extended protocol calls
without manually switching protocols.
Table 5.2 describes an example packet from the OBC to AaSI. The com-
mand is an AaSI-speciﬁc extended text command that requests the current
value of sensor 1 register 1. Table 5.3 describes an example response packet
from AaSI that contains the successful register value 7.
Field Data (in hex) Description
Packet length 06
Command 43 AASI_CMD_TEXT
(extended text command)
Status 00 Requests have status 0x00
Data 53 31 2C 31 "S1,1"
Checksum 3B
Table 5.2: Example Aalto-1 I2C request packet
5.3 libicp shared library
The libicp shared library provides high-level functions for internal commu-
nication, including functions for accessing I2C devices from user-space. The
library uses directly the /dev/i2c-0 device exposed by the kernel. The de-
vice and the physical I2C bus are shared and libicp calls may be done by
CHAPTER 5. AALTO-1 I2C PROTOCOL AND LIBRARY 39
Field Data (in hex) Description
Packet length 08
Command 43 AASI_CMD_TEXT
(extended text command)
Status 00
Data 53 31 2C 31 2C 37 "S1,1,7"
Checksum 2F
Table 5.3: Example Aalto-1 I2C response packet
multiple programs, so a named POSIX semaphore is used to prevent simul-
taneous I2C transactions from interfering with each other. The semaphore is
acquired and released within libicp calls, so it is not possible for a library
client to misuse the semaphore mechanism in normal conditions. While the
semaphore is locked, a special signal handler is temporarily installed to detect
POSIX SIGINT and SIGTERM signals. The signals are caught, delayed, and
propagated only after the semaphore has been unlocked, so the semaphore is
not accidentally left in a locked state. Other signals and error scenarios can
still lead to issues with the semaphore. The library uses POSIX read and
write functions and does not use the POSIX O_NONBLOCK ﬂag, so the
calls are blocking calls.1
The most commonly used function in the library is i2c_send_d, which
is used to send an Aalto-1 I2C request packet and read a corresponding
response. An extra parameter msdelay can be used to insert a millisecond-
precision sleep between the request and response to give the target device
time to react to the request. Reading the response is retried up to three times
if a general read I/O error is detected, but a protocol veriﬁcation error, such
as an invalid checksum, will immediately terminate the call and it is up to
the caller to retry the entire operation if necessary.
5.4 Improvements to the original design
Minor Aalto-1 I2C protocol violations in AaSI were found in a late project
phase. For example, the protocol requires that the command ﬁeld in the
response packet is equal to the command ﬁeld in the request packet, but this
is untrue for a certain AaSI command. Therefore a new function with a quirks
parameter was added to libicp. The quirks parameter is a bit ﬁeld that
speciﬁes which protocol validity checks should be skipped when processing
1Reference: Aalto-1 libicp library source code, 2.1.2016
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Function Purpose
i2c_send Aalto-1 I2C protocol request and response
i2c_send_d Like i2c_send, but with an extra parameter
long msdelay
i2c_send_dq Like i2c_send_d, but with an extra parameter
int quirks
i2c_send_only Aalto-1 I2C protocol request
i2c_send_raw Raw I2C protocol request and response
i2c_send_raw_d Like i2c_send_raw, but with an extra parameter
long msdelay
Table 5.4: Fundamental libicp I2C functions
the response packet. This mechanism documents known violations at call
sites in the source code, and allows other error checks to remain in place.
5.5 Potential failure scenarios and design issues
5.5.1 Radiation-induced errors in I2C devices
Bit ﬂips in the I2C bus can corrupt data packets sent between devices. The
extended Aalto-1 protocol uses a packet checksum, which reduces the chances
of undetected bit ﬂip errors. However, the protocol and the libicp library do
not provide a consistent and heavily tested recovery mechanism, so the eﬀect
of a bit ﬂip depends on the application and the device it is communicating
with. An application with fail-fast behaviour terminates immediately when
an unexpected error occurs, which is acceptable if other recovery mechanisms
such as watchdogs are working as expected. In the worst case an application
will ignore an error, and continue even though the application or the device
may be in a wrong state.
The raw I2C protocol has no error detection or recovery mechanisms,
so many kinds of errors are possible. Further analysis would be needed to
determine what kind of errors corrupted packets could cause in practice. For
example, sending the wrong commands to the EPS could in theory cause
severe problems, but this is diﬃcult to determine without studying the EPS
software in detail.
The I2C bus is a shared bus and in Aalto-1 includes a wide variety of
components with diﬀerent expected levels of radiation resistance, so hard
errors in a single device can in the worst case prevent all other devices from
using the bus correctly. The eﬀects of such scenario could be slightly reduced
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by dividing critical and non-critical components to separate shared buses if
possible.
5.5.2 Weak XOR checksum eﬀectiveness
The checksum ﬁeld in packets makes the Aalto-1 I2C protocol more reliable
than the raw protocol in a nanosatellite environment. However, a XOR
checksum is not very eﬀective in detecting errors that aﬀect more than one
bit. For example, if a certain bit position is permanently stuck with a certain
value, a XOR checksum can fail to detect the error in all even-sized checksum
blocks.
T. Maxino investigated the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent checksum algorithms
in the context of embedded networks [31]. XOR had the lowest eﬃciency,
but also the smallest compute cost. However, a simple two's complement
checksum was found to be nearly twice as eﬀective as XOR with very little
or no change in compute cost. More advanced algorithms, such as CRC are
signiﬁcantly more eﬀective, but also require a greater compute cost.
For nanosatellite I2C communication, a two's complement checksum would
be a better checksum than XOR, and even CRC-based checksums could be
considered if the increased compute cost is acceptable. K. McCabe [32] mod-
iﬁed the CPX nanosatellite I2C bus to use 8-bit CRC, so it has already been
used in an existing nanosatellite project. A checksum longer than 8 bits
could be used to provide even better resilience to errors. T. Maxino [31] sug-
gests that doubling the checksum size can halve the probability of undetected
errors.
5.5.3 Semaphore abandonment
A named POSIX binary semaphore can become abandoned if it is locked
by a process but never unlocked. Even if the process crashes, no automatic
unlocking is performed. Therefore a binary semaphore may become aban-
doned and no other process can unlock it, unless some recovery mechanism is
implemented. It is possible to call sem_post from a diﬀerent process, but it
is a challenging task to implement the required signaling between processes
to support recovery without compromising the correct use of the semaphore.
The temporary POSIX signal handler used by libicp avoids this issue in
case of SIGINT and SIGKILL signals, but other signals and many kind of error
conditions involving a crash or a hang are still possible and can completely
block the use of I2C in the system. The EPS watchdog will eventually reset
the system since no I2C communication will be possible, but the timeout is
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fairly large, and while the semaphore in question is cleared, the issue may
appear again after rebooting the system.
One way to avoid the issue would have been to implement libicp as a
daemon instead of a library. A daemon could easily serialize access to the I2C
bus without requiring complicated signaling between multiple processes. For
example, a normal semaphore could be used, and crashes in client programs
or the daemon itself would not result in any permanent locking of the bus.
Another option would have been to consider the use of shared robust
pthread mutexes instead of POSIX semaphores. A pthread mutex can be
placed in shared memory and used in a robust manner in multiple processes
as long as PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED and PTHREAD_MUTEX_ROBUST are set.
If a process locks the mutex but terminates for any reason, a robust mutex
guarantees that some other thread will get the return value EOWNERDEAD, and
can mark the mutex as consistent and recover it. Since no actual state would
be guarded in libicp, the mutex could be marked as consistent without any
extra work. [21]
5.5.4 Blocking I/O
All reads and writes done by libicp use blocking calls, so there is no support
for any kind of timeouts. Therefore an I2C protocol read can in theory block
the calling process indeﬁnitely. Since writes are never retried, it is possible
that the calling process will never wake up if the slave device does not send
anything back. A better option would be to use something that supports
timeouts. For example, the POSIX select function could be used to read
the response.
If a broken slave device blocks all I2C communication permanently, the
system can still boot, but the EPS watchdog will not be reset. Therefore
periodical reboots can be expected in this scenario.
Chapter 6
Aalto-1 communication software
Aalto-1 uses two radios for communicating with the ground station. The
primary channel uses UHF, but S-band can also be used as a secondary
channel for downlinking purposes. S-band has a much higher bandwidth,
which is useful, because the satellite can generate a signiﬁcant amount of
data that needs to be downlinked. [22]
The UHF radio uses omnidirectional antennas, so it is not dependent on
a speciﬁc orientation of the satellite, and can function even when the ADCS
system is malfunctioning. [44]
This chapter focuses on the UHF radio and related protocols, because the
satellite can still function if the S-band radio stops working.
6.1 Communication protocols in previous nano-
satellite projects
A survey [33] conducted by P. Muri and J. McNair found the AX.25 and CW
protocols to be the most widely used communication protocols in CubeSat
projects. Many satellites use amateur radio frequencies, and AX.25 is a
popular protocol among amateur radio operators.
The CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) [26] is a protocol that can be used
transparently for both internal and external communication in a CubeSat.
The protocol has been designed to be usable with even 8-bit microcontrollers,
and could be used to implement a service-oriented architecture in a nanosatel-
lite. Unfortunately the CSP 1.0 protocol does not include protection for the
packet headers, which is a fundamental design ﬂaw from a reliability point
of view.
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6.2 Communication protocols
The main goal of the communication system is to transport packets between
the ground station and the satellite. Packets sent from either the satellite
or ground station software use a high-level protocol layered on top of a low-
level protocol. From a reliability point of view we are above all interested in
error detection and correction, so we focus here on protocol reliability, not
on low-level radio communication details.
Figure 6.1 illustrates how a TC packet from the ground station software
is transported to the OBC software, and how a TM packet from the OBC
software is transported to the ground station software. Table 6.1 summarizes
the used protocols and packet veriﬁcation mechanisms, such as checksums
and hashes.
OBC
UHF MCU
Ground Station
1.
2.3.
4.
Radio communication
UART communication
Figure 6.1: Packet transportation for a TC request and TM response
Protocols Packet veriﬁcation
1. Aalto-1 high-level, Aalto-1 low-level HMAC, CRC-16
2. Aalto-1 high-level, libicp HMAC, XOR
3. Aalto-1 high-level, libicp XOR
4. Aalto-1 high-level, Aalto-1 low-level CRC-16 (unchecked)
Table 6.1: Protocols and packet veriﬁcation in Figure 6.1
6.2.1 Low-level packet transportation
Aalto-1 includes support for AX.25 as the link-layer protocol in both the
satellite-side software and the ground station software. However, by default
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a custom protocol is used, and at the time of writing this thesis, AX.25
support was not actively used.
The UHF radio on the satellite side uses a transceiver chip from Texas
Instruments, which provides hardware support for low-level concerns such as
synchronization words. It also supports CRC-16 checksums, which can be
used to verify the validity of received packets. The transceiver chip is con-
nected to a radio microcontroller, which controls the transceiver and com-
municates with the OBC using an UART connection. If an invalid packet is
detected, an error message is sent to the OBC. Successful packets are sent
using the UART connection, and are received by the communication soft-
ware running on the OBC. An internal communication protocol similar to
the Aalto-1 I2C protocol is used in UART communication, so errors such as
bitﬂips can be detected using the XOR checksum.
On the ground station the low-level communication protocol is imple-
mented with custom software. The ground station software adds a CRC-16
checksum to sent TC packets, and on the satellite side the UHF radio micro-
controller veriﬁes the checksum.
When a TM packet is sent from the satellite, the satellite communication
software sends it using UART to the UHF radio microcontroller, which adds a
CRC-16 checksum to the packet. The ground station radio software receives
the packet and calculates the checksum, but at the time of writing this thesis,
the checksum was not validated. Therefore, bit errors in TM packets will not
be detected at the radio software level.1
6.2.2 Application-level protocol
The low-level protocol enables point-to-point packet transmission, but does
not provide multiplexing or other mechanisms for diﬀerentiating between
packet types, sources, or destinations. The high-level protocol is used at the
communication software level once a packet has been successfully transported
using the low-level protocol. Table 6.2 describes the packet structure in the
high-level protocol.
The high-level communication protocol also includes a keyed-hash mes-
sage authentication code (HMAC) based on a SHA-256 hash from the Secure
Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA-2) family. The ground-station software calculates
a HMAC code for each TC packet with a shared secret, and appends the
HMAC bytes to the packet data ﬁeld. Therefore the authenticity of the TC
packets sent to the satellite can be veriﬁed. However, TM packets originat-
ing from the satellite do not include the HMAC code, so the ground-station
1Reference: Aalto-1 source code, 2.1.2016
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cannot verify the authenticity of incoming packets.
The service and subservice ﬁelds enable multiplexing of packets, so they
are in many ways similar to ports in the widely used UDP protocol. However,
the service and subservice are never dynamic, and the supported values are
ﬁxed in advance. Each service exists only once in the system, so a stateful
service such as command execution uses global state and only supports one
execution at a time.
Field Size (bytes) Description
Packet type 1 0x10 = Telemetry, 0x11 = Telecommand
Sequence 2 Unsigned 16-bit sequence number
Service 1 Service number
Subservice 1 Subservice number
Data 0-247 Packet data
Total 5-252
Table 6.2: Aalto-1 application-level communication protocol packet structure
6.3 Communication daemon in the satellite
A communication software daemon is running at all times in the satellite.
The main loop of the program listens for radio packets from the UHF MCU
using the POSIX select function. The HMAC of incoming packets is checked,
and valid packets are passed to service-speciﬁc handler functions.
The system tracks and stores in non-volatile memory a timestamp of last
valid communication with the ground station. When the system detects that
the timestamp has not been updated in a predeﬁned interval, the communi-
cation software attempts to reset the currently used UHF radio by requesting
a radio swtich from the Arbiter, and then quickly switching back to the orig-
inal radio. If the timestamp is still not updated after a longer interval, the
system requests a UHF radio switch from the Arbiter. The timestamp is
updated when a valid packet from the UHF MCU is received, but this is
regardless of the HMAC check. Therefore packets which fail authentication
will still update the timestamp and can delay potential UHF radio switching.
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6.4 Potential failure scenarios and design issues
6.4.1 Inﬁnite failure loop
The ultimate goal of most reliability-related features in the satellite is to
keep the communication software main loop running. However, even if the
main loop is running, it does not necessarily guarantee that the satellite is
capable of meaningful communication with the ground station. Therefore it
is highly important that the communication software handles errors instead
of ignoring them and prefers fail-fast behaviour.
An inﬁnite main loop that does not enable successful communication is
a very bad scenario, because none of the watchdogs will reset the system as
long as the communication loop keeps resetting the userland watchdog.
6.4.2 UHF radio breakage
A UHF radio can break during ﬂight, but the Aalto-1 nanosatellite includes
two radios, so the other radio can still be operational. Switching is primar-
ily done by the communication daemon, but the Arbiter switching logic can
also switch the UHF radio. The main weakness in the radio switching is
the reliance on timestamps stored in the root memory. If the satellite RTC
fails even temporarily, the timestamps might not be reliable between reboots.
Also, if the Arbiter switches to a diﬀerent root memory, the previous times-
tamp information is no longer available.
6.4.3 Weaknesses in checksums and authentication
The architecture includes several ways to detect packet validity, but it also
has weaknesses. The XOR checksum used in the UART communication has
the weakness mentioned in Chapter 5, and TM packets do not have suﬃcient
packet validity checks. It is tempting to think that TM packets do not need
to be checked if they are simply data that is collected, such as telemetry
data. However, the data in TM packets can also used for decision making,
and incorrect data could lead to incorrect action, either by a human operator
or an automated process.
6.4.4 Weaknesses in recovery from errors
The architecture includes ways to detect errors, but error recovery is often
missing or incomplete. For example, a TC packet with an invalid CRC-
16 checksum is silently dropped, and the ground station must detect the
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failure by the use of a timeout. However, since TM packets can also be
unreliable, the ground station cannot always assume that the TC packet
was not received. TC packets can cause non-idempotent side-eﬀects in the
satellite, so resending TC packets in all timeout scenarios could result in
undesired eﬀects in the satellite.
6.4.5 Risky software development process
The communication software in Aalto-1 was one of the last software compo-
nents to be ﬁnished. Signiﬁcant changes were made very late in the project,
and there is no thorough automated test suite that could be used to ver-
ify the correctness of refactoring or bigger changes. These factors together
add a lot of uncertainty to the communication protocols and software. Man-
ual testing has been used to conﬁrm that everything works as expected in
normal conditions, but it is not suﬃcient to achieve high conﬁdence in the
components.
Chapter 7
Discussion
Nanosatellite projects attempt to make good compromises in hardware and
software choices in order to drive down the costs and minimize barriers of
entry for research. Choosing the right hardware and software for a mission
is challenging, and data gathered from existing research is useful in guiding
the selection process. An MSP430 MCU is a popular device that has been
included in many successful CubeSat projects, but it would be interesting to
see even more variety in nanosatellite hardware and to have empirical results
of how well diﬀerent devices work in space.
One highly interesting research area is the study of radiation eﬀects on
COTS hardware. There are already papers that have studied simple hard-
ware such as 16-bit MCUs, but it would be useful to have access to more data
about powerful hardware, such as 32-bit ARM processors. For example, it
would be interesting to see comprehensive radiation tolerance data about
Freescale iMX6 or Qualcomm Snapdragon processors. Unfortunately many
hardware vendors don't have publicly available information about radiation
resistance of their devices.
On the software side important criteria include approachability and fa-
miliarity to students, software complexity, and hardware requirements. A
Linux operating system is most likely more familiar to students instead of
alternatives such as FreeRTOS, unless the students are speciﬁcally studying
embedded software. It would be interesting to have more empirical results
of standard Linux operating systems in CubeSat projects. Due to commu-
nication constraints a nanosatellite cannot be as approachable as a simple
embedded computer such as Raspberry Pi running Linux, but the beneﬁts
of having a familiar system should not be underestimated.
H. Sanmark describes in his thesis many fundamental challenges faced in
the development of Aalto-1 nanosatellite software. Communication between
groups developing independent components, rapid changes in requirements,
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and lack of experience are signiﬁcant complicating factors. These factors
also make it diﬃcult to deﬁne a clear and appropriate software development
process for nanosatellite projects. [40]
Several CubeSats have been launched, and many more are currently under
development. However, it seems that most projects write their own software
and there is very little sharing involved, except for satellites sharing a com-
mon lineage. The CubeSat Space Protocol project is a good example of a
public open source project that can beneﬁt multiple CubeSat projects. It
would be useful to have more projects like it to faciliate nanosatellite soft-
ware development through code reuse. This could be especially useful for
software components that beneﬁt from rigorous testing, such as communica-
tion protocols.
More powerful hardware means more ﬂexibility in software choices. If the
software does not have tight performance requirements and does not need
access to low-level features of C, many software components could be written
using a diﬀerent language more suitable for general-purpose programming.
For example, dynamic programming languages such as Python or Javascript
are much more approachable than C, and their performance characteristics
are most likely acceptable if the hardware is powerful enough. Javascript is
sometimes thought to be a programming language reserved for web browsers,
but platforms such as Node.js make it a truly general-purpose programming
language.
P. Niemelä recognizes the importance of software testing in nanosatellite
projects. A core challenge in testing embedded software is the eﬀect of the
runtime environment and hardware to the software. For example, software
might be developed in parallel with the hardware, so testing the software in a
real hardware environment can be diﬃcult or impossible. In Aalto-1 the use
of Linux made it possible to perform some tests on development machines
without access to real hardware. [36]
The Rust programming language could be a good candidate for nanosatel-
lite software, because it is a systems programming language like C, but oﬀers
several language features that attempt to eliminate many common errors
typically found in C code. For example, safe Rust code includes memory
safety guarantees that help eliminate errors such as dangling pointers and
buﬀer overﬂows. Rust is a very new programming language, so at the mo-
ment students are most likely not familiar with it, but this might change in
a couple of years if Rust becomes more widely adopted. The performance
of Rust is similar to C and C++, and it has been used to implement highly
eﬃcient software, such as zero copy parsers [11].
Using high-level programming languages can reduce the risk of low-level
programmer errors, but many ideas could also be adopted from safety-critical
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software to further improve the reliability of nanosatellite software. Safety-
critical design processes such as STPA [47] could be used when designing a
software and hardware architecture for a nanosatellite. An important detail
that might be forgotten in nanosatellite reliability is the possibility of human
error. It is very easy to focus on space as an environment when assessing the
reliability, but a human operator error can also lead to a mission failure.
In addition to using modern programming languages and design processes,
formal tools could be used to verify correctness of nanosatellite software com-
ponents. The CubeSat Space Protocol has been used in several CubeSats,
but it seems that no proof of correctness has been performed. G. Holzmann
[20] recommends that newly designed protocols should be treated with sus-
picion until their correctness has been proved.
Protocols are perhaps the most obvious candidates for veriﬁcation, but
any kind of program behaviour, especially of critical components, could be
veriﬁed. In a simple case program behaviour could be modeled as a state
machine, and a model checker could be used to verify assumptions about the
model. X. Gan, J. Dubrovin, K. Heljanko [18] used symbolic model checking
to verify a a satellite attitude and orbit control system. Verifying software
components with such tools and methodologies could improve the reliability
of a nanosatellite.
A core challenge in building reliable software components is integration
with other components and the runtime environment. For example, the
original design of a reliability-related component such as a watchdog may
seem good if the component is inspected in isolation. However, when looking
at the big picture and how components interact, it might be possible to ﬁnd
gaps in the design. In some cases several components may even compete
with each other even though the components may work well in isolation.
This necessitates evaluation and inspection of components from both low-
level and high-level points of view.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
The goal of this thesis was to evaluate important parts of Aalto-1 nanosatel-
lite software from a reliability point of view. Building a reliable satellite is
a diﬃcult task, and requires careful design considerations in both hardware
and software. Since communication with failed satellites might be limited
or impossible, evaluation and analysis of the hardware and software compo-
nents is important. Evaluation results together with data collected during
the mission can be used to improve the design, implementation, and work-
ing processes of future nanosatellite projects. The failure rate of 50% in
university nanosatellite projects suggests that there are still many potential
research topics and improvement areas in the ﬁeld. Finding a good compro-
mise between approachability to students and the use of robust but diﬃcult
techniques and tools is a fundamental challenge, which is one major area of
diﬀerence between industrial and educational projects.
We have evaluated several critical components of the Aalto-1 software
architecture, and added improvements to the original design. Reliability has
clearly been considered in the major areas of the architecture, but there is
still room for improvement. Some parts of the architecture have some unnec-
essary complexity, and there are also some known ﬂaws. The communication
software is an extremely important software component, and while it may
not be a brittle component in practice, the evaluation pointed out several
uncertainties in the design and implementation. The probability of having
such uncertainties could be reduced in future projects by building the com-
munication software and having end-to-end tests for it as early as possible in
the project.
Potential future research topics include robust communication protocols
and managing hardware redundancy and fault detection in a Linux nanosatel-
lite. The ﬁeld could also beneﬁt from more active sharing of built software.
However, simply sharing source code is not enough, and shared software
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should be built and documented with the assumption that other projects
might be interested in reusing the software. Critical software components
such as communication protocols could also beneﬁt from formal veriﬁcation.
Even with some ﬂaws in the design, the future of Aalto-1 looks bright.
The time after the soon approaching launch will be the ﬁnal validation of
the design and implementation of the satellite. Nanosatellite reliability is an
active research topic, and regardless of the mission result of Aalto-1, future
projects can beneﬁt from the contributions of Aalto-1 and this thesis.
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Appendix A
Userland watchdog source code
The following listing shows the C source code of the main loop function of
the userland watchdog. The main loop accepts several parameters that are
read from command-line arguments.
static void main_loop(bool foreground, int timeout_s,
int sleep_s, time_t watch_timeout_s)
{
int log_options = LOG_PID | LOG_PERROR;
openlog("userland-watchdog", log_options, LOG_LOCAL0);
if (!foreground) {
/* daemon() is not portable, but uclibc implements
* it in a sane way */
if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to daemonize: %s", strerror(errno));
return;
}
}
if (!watch_file_create(WATCHDOG_WATCH_FILE)) {
return;
}
int fd = watchdog_open(timeout_s);
if (fd < 0) {
return;
}
60
APPENDIX A. USERLAND WATCHDOG SOURCE CODE 61
if (!activate_heartbeat()) {
return;
}
/* monotonic timestamp of current time */
struct timespec current_time;
/* monotonic timestamp of last time we saw a modification */
struct timespec last_modification;
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &current_time) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to get current time: %s", strerror(errno));
return;
}
last_modification = current_time;
time_t last_st_mtime = 0;
struct stat file_stat;
syslog(LOG_INFO, "Watchdog started: timeout=%ds, sleep=%ds",
timeout_s, sleep_s);
while(true) {
if (!watchdog_keepalive(fd)) {
return;
}
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &current_time) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to get current time: %s", strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (stat(WATCHDOG_WATCH_FILE, &file_stat) < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to stat target file: %s", strerror(errno));
/* We don't need to exit immediately after a single stat error.
* If the error is permanent, the watch timeout will exceed later
* since the last_modification is never updated */
} else {
if (file_stat.st_mtime != last_st_mtime) {
/* Somebody has touched the file! */
last_st_mtime = file_stat.st_mtime;
last_modification = current_time;
}
}
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if (current_time.tv_sec - last_modification.tv_sec > watch_timeout_s) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Watch timeout exceeded");
return;
}
/* We can ignore the return value, because it's always ok
* to sleep less than sleep_s seconds */
sleep(sleep_s);
}
}
